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Introduction
Twenty years ago, to confirm an intuition about the variety of rain
hats, a trial judge may have needed to travel to a local department
store to survey the rain hats on offer. Rather than expend that
time, he likely would have relied on his common sense to take judi-
cial notice of the fact that not all rain hats are alike. Today, how-
ever, a judge need only take a few moments to confirm his
intuition by conducting a basic Internet search.1
LIKE THAT JUDGE confirming his intuition about the variety of
rain hats, courts use the Internet as their substitute for a shopping
expedition and, increasingly, they are taking judicial notice to recog-
nize the existence of a fact without requiring specific proof of that
fact. But appropriate facts for judicial notice must be “‘within the do-
main of the indisputable.’”2 As the Internet has grown in breadth and
in depth, courts have increasingly run into the question of whether to
accord judicial notice to the information found there.
Under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a court “may
judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute”3 if its
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1. United States v. Bari, 599 F.3d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 2010).
2. Kenneth Culp Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, in
PERSPECTIVES OF LAW 82 (Roscoe Pound et al. eds., 1964) (quoting Edmund M. Morgan,
Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REV. 269, 293 (1944)).
3. FED. R. EVID. 201(b).
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provenance is satisfactory, meaning that the fact either “(1) is gener-
ally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be
accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy can-
not reasonably be questioned.”4 The judicial notice rule is intended to
streamline judicial proceedings by acknowledging that there are some
things so universally known or beyond challenge that requiring proof
of their existence would be a waste of time and resources.
As an illustration, consider a case in which the plaintiff alleged
that defendant music and recording companies owed her royalties for
songs she recorded with Elvis Presley in 1999.5 Using the Internet to
confirm that the King was not alive that year, the magistrate judge
quickly dispatched the matter:
According to sources on the World Wide Web, Mr. Presley died on
August 16, 1977[,] and, considering the recent celebration of the
30th anniversary of Mr. Presley’s death, the Court will take judicial
notice that Mr. Presley was deceased in 1999 and not capable of
personally recording with plaintiff, and this matter will be dis-
missed as frivolous.6
As the Presley case illustrates, judicial notice is an expedient way to
confirm indisputable facts. Neither much time nor many resources
are needed to locate factual information on the Internet, and that is
certainly part of its attraction to legal and judicial researchers. Enter-
ing relevant search terms into a search engine, such as Google, re-
trieves links to hundreds—if not thousands—of websites whose
contents may contain exactly what the researcher is looking for. Many
courts are hesitant, however, to regard websites in general as appropri-
ate sources for judicial notice, and they often have good basis for that
reluctance.7 While the Internet furnishes a convenient mechanism for
ready determination of a fact, not all the sources on the Internet are
unquestionably accurate.8 Furthermore, a fact is not necessarily “gen-
erally known”9 simply because it easily can be found online. Whether
4. Id.
5. Presley v. RCA, Nos. 07-508-RET-CN, 07-05-259-M2, 2007 WL 4139716, at *1 (M.D.
La. Nov. 16, 2007).
6. Id.
7. See infra notes 49-66 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., SNOPES, http://www.snopes.com (last visited Sept. 24, 2013 ) (a popular
fact-checking website with a category for debunked computer- and Internet-related myths).
9. E.g., United States v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 1999) (quoting 21 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & KENNETH A. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5105, at 407
(1977)) (“By ‘generally known’ Rule 201(b)(1) ‘must refer to facts which exist in the un-
aided memory of the populace; if the fact is one that a reasonable person would not know
from memory but would know where to find, it falls within subdivision (2),’ not (1).”).
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the contents of any website will satisfy the requirements of judicial
notice under Rule 201 can be a difficult question to determine.
Some of the difficulty in applying Rule 201 to facts contained in
online sources stems from the Internet’s relatively new status as a pub-
lication medium. Rule 201 itself gives no specific guidance for elec-
tronic sources of facts. Although other federal court rules, discovery
rules in particular, have been amended to reflect their applicability to
evidence in electronic form,10 Rule 201 has not undergone similar
amendment. Rule 201 has been amended only once since its adop-
tion, and that amendment served merely stylistic purposes.11 An in-
quiry is warranted, therefore, into Rule 201’s applicability and
functionality when the facts to be judicially noticed are published on
the Internet.
Part I of this Article examines the basic standards for according
judicial notice in civil cases in the federal courts. Part II addresses the
authoritativeness and the reliability of web-based factual sources, in-
10. For example, Rules 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, and 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure were amended in 2006 to clarify their applicability to discovery of electronically
stored information. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 28
U.S.C. app. at 129 (2006). In contrast, it was not until 2011 that Federal Rule of Evidence
101 was amended to specifically include electronically stored information in the eviden-
tiary rules’ references to “written material.” FED. R. EVID. 101 advisory committee’s note. In
that same year, the best evidence rule’s definition of “original” was amended to include an
electronic source’s “printout—or other output readable by sight” provided that it “accu-
rately reflects the information.” FED. R. EVID. 1001(d).
11. See FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s note. The current text of the federal
rule is as follows:
(a) Scope. This rule governs judicial notice of an adjudicative fact only, not a
legislative fact.
(b) Kinds of Facts That May Be Judicially Noticed. The court may judicially notice
a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it:
(1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or
(2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy can-
not reasonably be questioned.
(c) Taking Notice. The court:
(1) may take judicial notice on its own; or
(2) must take judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied with
the necessary information.
(d) Timing. The court may take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding.
(e) Opportunity to Be Heard. On timely request, a party is entitled to be heard
on the propriety of taking judicial notice and the nature of the fact to be noticed.
If the court takes judicial notice before notifying a party, the party, on request, is
still entitled to be heard.
(f) Instructing the Jury. In a civil case, the court must instruct the jury to accept
the noticed fact as conclusive. In a criminal case, the court must instruct the jury
that it may or may not accept the noticed fact as conclusive.
FED. R. EVID. 201.
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cluding online reference works such as Wikipedia. Part III discusses
evidentiary challenges that may be raised when a party proposes that
specific factual information is an appropriate candidate for judicial
notice. Such challenges address evidentiary requirements such as au-
thenticity, relevance, hearsay, and accuracy. By extension, this part of
the Article also serves to demonstrate the “necessary information”12
that counsel offering such evidence should consider and secure
before requesting judicial notice from the court. Finally, Part IV deals
with due process considerations related to judicial notice, particularly
with regard to the timeliness of the request for notice and the oppor-
tunity for a hearing giving the opponent of the evidence an opportu-
nity to raise objections, a significant matter when a court takes notice
sua sponte.
This Article cites a wide range of cases examining these issues,
and for the greatest part, they support the author’s conclusion that
although courts are wise to view Internet-based sources for judicial
notice with some caution and a dose of skepticism, they should not
reject such sources for the sole reason that they are online. This Arti-
cle also shows that the judicial notice rule does not need modification
to deal with Internet-based sources.13 Case law amply demonstrates
that by using familiar standards for admissibility of evidence, courts
will be able to identify unsuitable web-based sources that are inappro-
priate sources for judicial notice.
I. Judicial Notice Standards in the Federal Courts
Long in use as a common-law evidentiary doctrine,14 judicial
notice was officially codified for courts of the United States in
12. FED. R. EVID. 201(c)(2).
13. But see Christopher Onstott, Judicial Notice and the Law’s “Scientific” Search for Truth,
40 AKRON L. REV. 465, 487–88 (2007) (recommending a “new judicial notice standard” for
scientific evidence); Dorothy F. Easley, Judicial Notice on Appeal: A History Lesson in Recent
Trends, 84 FLA. B.J. 45, 48 (2010) (suggesting that it may be necessary to “codify an appel-
late rule clarifying judicial notice provisions in the appellate context”).
14. See 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 535 (3d ed.
1940) (“That a matter is judicially noticed means merely that it is taken as true without the
offering of evidence by the party who should ordinarily have done so.”); Arthur John
Keeffe, William B. Landis, Jr. & Robert B. Shaad, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial Notice, 2
STAN. L. REV. 664, 664 (1950) (“[N]ot every fact is proved during the course of a law suit—
manifesta probatione non indigent (what is known need not be proved). This practice has its
roots far back in the civil and canon law. It is part and parcel of legal or judicial reasoning,
no step of which can be taken without assuming something that has not been proved. The
capacity to perform this process with competent judgment and efficiency is imputed to
judges and juries as part of their necessary mental outfit.”).
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197515 when Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence.16 Rule
201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is limited in its scope; it explicitly
“governs judicial notice of an adjudicative fact only, not a legislative
fact.”17 Adjudicative facts are those facts connected to the subject of
the litigation: “[T]he parties, their activities, their properties, their
businesses.”18 Put another way, adjudicative facts are “‘those facts that
gave rise to and must be proved to resolve the action.’”19 They are the
sorts of facts normally found by a jury.20
In contrast to adjudicative facts, legislative facts “are necessary to
interpret the scope and meaning of the law.”21 They “do not directly
relate to the matters in dispute between the parties.”22 As one court
explained the distinction, “[W]hether a fact is adjudicative or legisla-
tive depends upon the manner in which it is used. A legal rule may be
a proper fact for judicial notice if it is offered to establish the factual
context of the case, as opposed to stating the governing law.”23 Legis-
lative facts are those relevant “to legal reasoning and the lawmaking
process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a
judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body.”24 Therefore
15. Considering this article’s focus on the Internet, it is noteworthy that even though
the year 1975 is ancient history for technology (and the Federal Rules of Evidence), it was
still a watershed year for personal computing and the eventual development of the In-
ternet. For example, it marked the appearance of the Altair 8800 microcomputer, it saw
the emergence of the first modern email program, and it was the year Bill Gates and Paul
Allen founded Microsoft. PAUL E. CERUZZI, A HISTORY OF MODERN COMPUTING 226 (2d ed.
2003) (describing the announcement of the Altair 8800 as “rank[ing] with IBM’s an-
nouncement of the System/360 a decade earlier as one of the most significant in the his-
tory of computing”); Cameron Chapman, The History of the Internet in a Nutshell, SIX
REVISIONS (Nov. 15, 2009), http://sixrevisions.com/resources/the-history-of-the-internet-
in-a-nutshell/; Facts About Microsoft, MICROSOFT NEWS CENTER, http://www.microsoft.com/
presspass/insidefacts_ms.mspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
16. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93–595, 88 Stat. 1926.
17. FED. R. EVID. 201(a). For useful insights on courts’ judicial notice of non-adjudica-
tive facts, see Richard B. Cappalli, Bringing Internet Information to Court: Of “Legislative Facts,”
75 TEMP. L. REV. 99 (2002).
18. Qualley v. Clo-Tex Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 1123, 1128 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting FED. R.
EVID. 201(a) advisory committee’s note).
19. Paul R. Rice, The Evidence Project: Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence,
171 F.R.D. 330, 340 (1997) (quoting a proposed Federal Rule of Evidence, Rule 201(a),
defining adjudicative facts).
20. See id.
21. Id. at 385 (quoting a proposed Federal Rule of Evidence, Rule 202, governing
legislative facts).
22. Id. (quoting a proposed Federal Rule of Evidence, Rule 202, governing legislative
facts).
23. Toth v. Grand Trunk R.R., 306 F.3d 335, 349 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
24. FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app. at 129
(2006).
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a court would be correct in refusing to take judicial notice of, for ex-
ample, the holding of a case.25 But this does not mean that a court is
precluded from relying upon legislative facts in its decision-making;
Rule 201 simply does not cover such facts.
When a court judicially notices a fact in the course of trial in a
civil case, it instructs the jury to accept the fact as conclusive.26 The
use of judicial notice is not restricted to trial settings, however. It is
not uncommon for courts to judicially notice facts in the course of
deciding dispositive motions such as motions to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or motions for summary judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.27 And because judicial no-
tice of undisputed facts may be taken “at any stage of the proceed-
ing,”28 appellate courts are empowered to take judicial notice of facts
in the course of an appeal.29
Rule 201 permits a court to judicially notice facts that are “gener-
ally known”30 or facts that can easily be located within “sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”31 From a policy perspec-
tive, if a fact is widely known or indisputable, there is no good reason
to make a party jump through evidentiary hoops for its admission. On
the other hand, “[j]udicial notice is not a mechanism by which a party
can offer into evidence documents that do not fall into one of the
specific categories” that Rule 201 identifies.32
25. See, e.g., Johnson v. Grays Harbor Cmty. Hosp., 385 F. App’x 647, 649 n.2 (9th Cir.
2010) (declining request to take judicial notice of case standing for the proposition that
“medical staff appointments constitute implied contracts”).
26. FED. R. EVID. 201(f). In a criminal case, in contrast, the jury is instructed that it has
the choice whether to treat the fact as conclusive. Id.
27. See, e.g., Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir. 2007) (“In ruling on a
12(b)(6) motion, a court may generally consider only allegations contained in the plead-
ings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial notice.”);
Nat’l Ass’n for Gun Rights, Inc. v. Murry, No. CV 12–95–H–DLC, 2013 WL 5200756, at *3
(D. Mont. Sept. 17, 2013) (“A court may take judicial notice at any stage in the proceed-
ings, including when ruling on summary judgment motions.”).
28. FED. R. EVID. 201(d).
29. See, e.g., Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 681 F.3d 1208, 1212–13 (10th
Cir. 2012) (taking notice of the existence, although not the truthfulness, of vehicle defect
documents in an administrative agency’s files). For a discussion of the concerns surround-
ing assessment of Internet evidence for its truthfulness, see infra Part III.C and the text
accompanying notes 91–100. Some appellate courts have viewed judicial notice as tanta-
mount to fact finding, however, and have declined invitations to employ it. See infra text
accompanying notes 147–51.
30. FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(1).
31. FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2).
32. Meeker v. Belridge Water Storage Dist., No. 1:05-CV-00603 OWW SMS, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 91775, at *33 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2006).
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Despite its broad use, the judicial notice doctrine has always had
limits and challenges.33 While “judicial notice applies to self-evident
truths that no reasonable person could question, truisms that ap-
proach platitudes or banalities,”34 it must be remembered that “[f]or
all practical purposes, judicially noticing a fact is tantamount to di-
recting a verdict against a party as to the noticed fact.”35 Accordingly,
“[b]ecause the effect of judicial notice is to deprive a party of the op-
portunity to use rebuttal evidence, cross-examination, and argument
to attack contrary evidence, caution must be used in determining that
a fact is beyond controversy under Rule 201(b).”36 In the case of facts
sought to be noticed from sources on the Internet, such caution is no
less warranted.
II. Authority and Reliability of Facts on the Internet
To accord judicial notice to facts contained in a proffered source,
a court must be satisfied that the information there is authoritative
and reliable.37 Our views of what materials are authoritative and relia-
ble are somewhat different today from what they were a decade or two
ago, and they are radically different from what they were a hundred
years ago. Professor Robert Berring gave us a revealing illustration of
the American legal community’s view of authority when he compared
sources cited by the United States Supreme Court in its opinions is-
sued one hundred years apart, in 1899 and in 1999.38 The century-old
cases relied almost exclusively on cases and statutes, with almost no
citation of secondary materials.39 Professor Berring found that the
representative modern cases, in contrast, also relied on “authorities
from all corners of the information galaxy.”40 Today’s courts are in-
creasingly willing to consider, and even to cite, sources outside the
33. See, e.g., Vowles v. Craig, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 371, 377 (1814) (“No evidence ap-
pears in the record to shew that military surveys do usually contain surplus lands, and it is
supposed without such proof the Court cannot take judicial notice of such an allegation.”).
34. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 347 (5th Cir. 1982).
35. LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. First Conn. Holding Group, L.L.C. XXIII, 287 F.3d 279, 290
(3d Cir. 2002).
36. Int’l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 146 F.3d 66, 70
(2d Cir. 1998).
37. See, e.g., United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 549 (D. Md. 2002) (“The
doctrine of judicial notice is predicated upon the assumption that the source materials
from which the court takes judicial notice are reliable.”).
38. Robert C. Berring, Legal Information and the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1673, 1683–91 (2000).
39. Id. at 1686–87.
40. Id. at 1689.
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traditional mainstream of authority—sources that some have labeled
as “nonlegal.”41 As Professors Frederick Schauer and Virginia Wise
have observed, “[T]he sources we designate as ‘nonlegal’ are sources
that would only rarely have been available even in a well-stocked law
library and would generally have been the subject of at least a raised
eyebrow if included in a first-year moot court brief.”42
Familiarity breeds respect, however. In evaluating the suitability
of sources for judicial notice, courts today confront their familiar—as
well as unique—features, often comparing them to more traditional
print sources that have long been deemed authoritative and reliable.
The Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly recognize, for example, that
treatises “can be established as reliable authority . . . by judicial no-
tice.”43 And courts have routinely used almanacs,44 dictionaries,45 en-
cyclopedias,46 and textbooks47 in print as acceptable sources of facts
for judicial notice. The propriety of judicially noticing analogous in-
formation on the Internet, however, is an issue that has provoked dif-
ferent responses from courts across the country. Some courts
judicially notice facts from web-based sources with no discussion or
fanfare, demonstrating a liberal willingness to accept websites as ac-
41. See Ellie Margolis, Authority Without Borders: The World Wide Web and the Delegalization
of Law, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 920 (2011) (finding that use of nonlegal sources in
judicial opinions has increased significantly over the course of the twentieth century); Jer-
emy Patrick, Beyond Case Reporters: Using Newspapers to Supplement the Legal-Historical Record (A
Case Study of Blasphemous Libel), 3 DREXEL L. REV. 539, 539–40 (2011) (finding that the
realm of potentially relevant authority has increased significantly); Frederick Schauer &
Virginia J. Wise, Nonlegal Information and the Delegalization of Law, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 495, 495
(2000) (finding that increased access to nonlegal information has increased citations to
such materials); John J. Hasko, Persuasion in the Court: Nonlegal Materials in U.S. Supreme
Court Opinions, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 427 (2002) (finding a broad pattern of use of nonlegal
materials in the opinions of the Supreme Court Justices).
42. Schauer & Wise, supra note 41, at 499.
43. United States v. Norman, 415 F.3d 466, 473 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing FED. R. EVID.
803(18)).
44. E.g., Allen v. Allen, 518 F. Supp. 1234, 1235 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (using an un-
named almanac to establish a date).
45. E.g., Turman-Kent v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 657 F.3d 1280, 1290 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(citing three medical dictionaries for the proposition that “brain damage resulting from a
stroke is irreversible”); United States v. Henry, 417 F.3d 493, 494 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing a
dictionary as one of several sources for the judicially noticed fact that “both a 12-gauge
shotgun and a 16-gauge shotgun have bore diameters in excess of one-half inch”).
46. E.g., Singh v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2004) (taking notice of an
article in the Encyclopædia Britannica).
47. E.g., Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Pottorff, 291 U.S. 245, 254 n.4, amended sub nom. Tex. &
Pac. Ry. Co. v. First Nat’l Bank of El Paso, Tex., 291 U.S. 649 (1934) (reflecting contents of
treatises and textbooks on banks and banking practices); In re Norris, 179 F.2d 970, 973
(C.C.P.A. 1950) (addressing facts represented in organic chemistry texts).
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ceptable compendia for these facts, with no apparent mistrust of the
online medium itself.48 Others have categorically dismissed facts ap-
pearing on an Internet source as unreliable, regardless of their prove-
nance.49 One federal district court took this view of facts taken from
the United States Coast Guard’s online vessel database:
While some look to the Internet as an innovative vehicle for com-
munication, the Court continues to warily and wearily view it
largely as one large catalyst for rumor, innuendo, and misinforma-
tion . . . . Anyone can put anything on the Internet. No web-site is
monitored for accuracy and nothing contained therein is under
oath or even subject to independent verification absent underlying
documentation. Moreover, the Court holds no illusions that hack-
ers can adulterate the content on any web-site from any location at
any time.50
It is certainly true, as St. Clair declares, that anyone can publish
on the Internet, particularly as today’s computers and software have
taken much of the complexity out of website construction. Thus, to
the extent that traditional print publishers have served as filters or
hurdles to would-be authors, the self-publication aspect of the In-
ternet makes judges mistrustful of the reliability of the sources availa-
ble there. And to be sure, a number of websites contain no clues as to
their provenance, their authors, or the sources upon which they pur-
48. See, e.g., O’Toole v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 499 F.3d 1218, 1225 (10th Cir.
2007) (“It is not uncommon for courts to take judicial notice of factual information found
on the world wide web.”); Road Dawgs Motorcycle Club of the U.S., Inc. v. Cuse Road
Dawgs, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 259, 276 n.41 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing print and online sources
for judicial notice of the meaning of the phrase “road dawg”); LaGatta v. Penn. Cyber
Charter Sch., No. 08–1268, 2011 WL 3957294, at *5 n.4 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 7, 2011) (describ-
ing its citation of an online medical dictionary and declaring that “[a] court may rely on
and take judicial notice of dictionary definitions”); Birmingham v. Mizuno U.S.A., Inc., No.
5:09–CV–0566 (GTS/GHL), 2011 WL 1299356, at *7 n.8 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011) (citing
online sources in taking judicial notice of various meanings of the phrase “soft hands”);
Solid 21, Inc. v. Breitling U.S.A. Inc., No. CV 11–0457 GAF (PLAx), 2011 WL 2938209, at
*4 n.1 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2011) (“Defendant submitted a copy of the Oxford English Dic-
tionary that is virtually illegible. However, the Court takes judicial notice that the Oxford
English Dictionary website lists this definition . . . .”).
49. E.g., Grabein v. Jupiterimages Corp., No. 07-22288-CIV, 2008 WL 2704451, at *9
(S.D. Fla. July 7, 2008) (refusing to give judicial notice to Wikipedia’s definition of “credit
card numbers” because anyone could edit the definition).
50. St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774–75 (S.D. Tex.
1999) (emphasis omitted). Although St. Clair was not a judicial-notice case, it has been
cited in support of a court’s refusal to accept Internet-based sources for judicial notice of
facts. See, e.g., Crochet v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 6:11–01404, 2012 WL 489204, at *4
(W.D. La. Feb. 13, 2012). For years, the federal judge who wrote St. Clair maintained his
position on the suspect nature of Internet-sourced information. See Perforaciones Mariti-
mas Mexicanas S.A. de C.V. v. Seacor Holdings, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 2d 825, 832 (S.D. Tex.
2006).
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portedly rely, raising concerns about the propriety of viewing them as
unquestionably accurate.51
The dynamic, evolving nature of the Internet also contributes to
some judges’ fears of the medium. Unlike static physical objects such
as books, which exist in multiple identical copies, existing web pages
may disappear overnight, or at least, may be substantially modified
from their previous appearance, whether in terms of their content,
organization, or navigation.52 Many scholars, including this author,
have documented the fragility of citations to web-based sources, con-
cluding that over a significantly short time period, they change, disap-
pear, or become difficult to locate.53 Certainly all legal researchers,
the author included, have encountered hyperlinks that are no longer
functional. An article in the Washington Post quotes a researcher in
the sciences who likens the prevalence of dead web links to the burn-
ing of the library at Alexandria.54 The same article quotes a digital
librarian’s view of these dismal statistics: “ ‘The average lifespan of a
Web page today is 100 days. This is no way to run a culture.’”55
Some websites are amazingly robust, however. The immensely
popular Wikipedia, “the free encyclopedia that anyone can edit,”56
first went online in 2001.57 Presently containing more than four mil-
51. See, e.g., Quan v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 883, 891 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (O’Scannlain, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted) (“The majority’s reliance on a website of unknown reliability
to establish that ‘banks in China are typically open on Sundays,’ is a novel—and, I would
respectfully suggest, misguided—application of the doctrine of judicial notice.”).
52. See, e.g., Mullinax v. United Mktg. Grp., L.L.C., No. 1:10-CV-03585-JEC, 2011 WL
4085933, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 13, 2011) (refusing to take judicial notice of screenshots
that altered over time); Ferrington v. McAfee, Inc., No. 10–CV–01455–LHK, 2010 WL
3910169, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2010) (declining to take judicial notice of a reconstructed
web page that differed from its original version).
53. See, e.g., Coleen M. Barger, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Judge: Appellate
Courts’ Use of Internet Materials, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 417, 419 (2002); Mary F. Casserly
& James E. Bird, 64 COLLEGE & RES. LIBR. 300, 301 (2003); Sarah Rhodes, Breaking Down
Link Rot: The Chesapeake Project Legal Information Archive’s Examination of URL Stability, 102
LAW LIBR. J. 581, 582 (2010); Mary Rumsey, Runaway Train: Problems of Permanence, Accessibil-
ity, and Stability in the Use of Web Sources in Law Review Citations, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 27 (2002);
Carmine Sellitto, The Impact of Impermanent Web-Located Citations: A Study of 123 Scholarly
Conference Publications, 56 J. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. & TECH. 695 (2005).
54. See Rick Weiss, On the Web, Research Work Proves Ephemeral; Electronic Archivists Are
Playing Catch-Up in Trying to Keep Documents From Landing in History’s Dustbin, WASH. POST,
Nov. 24, 2003, at A08 (quoting Robert Dellavalle of the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in
Denver).
55. Id. (quoting Brewster Kahle of the Internet Archive in San Francisco).
56. WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
57. History of Wikipedia, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_
Wikipedia (last visited June 6, 2013).
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lion English language articles58 on an almost impossibly broad array
of topics, Wikipedia is a popular portal for twenty-first century re-
searchers making preliminary inquiries into a topic.59 As an easily ac-
cessed source of facts in popular culture, it has no equal. And yet it
has provoked the greatest degree of commentary and scholarly analy-
sis of the pros and cons of reliance on Internet-based sources.60
Courts have also generally been unwilling to accept Wikipedia as a
source for facts to be judicially noticed, most often giving the reason
that Internet sources like Wikipedia are not consistently reliable.61
58. Id.
59. See Kathryn Zickuhr & Lee Rainie, Wikipedia, Past and Present, PEW INTERNET &
AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT (Jan. 13, 2011), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Wikipedia.
aspx (reporting findings of a Pew Internet survey stating that “[t]he percentage of all
American adults who use Wikipedia to look for information has increased from 25% in
February 2007 to 42% in May 2010”). The percentage has likely increased since this survey
was conducted.
60. See, e.g., Daniel J. Baker, A Jester’s Promenade: Citations to Wikipedia in Law Reviews,
2002–2008, 7 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 361 (2012); Tina S. Ching, The Next Genera-
tion of Legal Citations: A Survey of Internet Citations in the Opinions of the Washington Supreme
Court and Washington Appellate Courts, 1999–2005, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 387 (2007);
Joseph L. Gerken, How Courts Use Wikipedia, 11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 191 (2010); Doro-
thy A. Harbeck & Yoonji Kim, Is the Internet “Voodoo”?: Evidentiary Weight of Internet-Based
Material in Immigration Court, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (2010); Jason C. Miller & Hannah B.
Murray, Wikipedia in Court: When and How Citing Wikipedia and Other Consensus Websites Is
Appropriate, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 633 (2010); Diane Murley, In Defense of Wikipedia, 100 LAW
LIBR. J. 593 (2008); Lee F. Peoples, The Citation of Wikipedia in Judicial Opinions, 12 YALE J.L.
& TECH. 1 (2009); Kenneth N. Rashbaum, Matthew F. Knouff & Dominique Murray, Admis-
sibility of Non-U.S. Electronic Evidence, 18 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2012), http://jolt.richmond.
edu/v18i3/article9.pdf; Michael Whiteman, The Death of Twentieth-Century Authority, 58
UCLA L. REV. DISC. 27 (2010), available at http://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/discourse/
58-3.pdf; Bryan C. Berman, Note, You Can’t Trademark That! Wikipedia Said So, 30 WHITTIER
L. REV. 825 (2009); Amber Lynn Wagner, Comment, Wikipedia Made Law? The Federal Judi-
cial Citation of Wikipedia, 26 JOHN MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 229 (2008); David J.
Dansky, The Google Knows Many Things: Judicial Notice in the Internet Era, 39 COLO. LAW. 19
(2010); R. Jason Richards, Courting Wikipedia, 44 TRIAL 62 (2008); Joe Palazzola, Which Fed-
eral Appeals Court Cites Wikipedia Most Often?, WALL ST. J. LAW BLOG (Apr. 23, 2012, 7:35
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/04/23/which-federal-appeals-court-cites-wikipedia-
most/.
61. E.g., Gonzales v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 861 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1104 n.4 (S.D.
Cal. 2012) (“The Court declines Plaintiff’s request to take judicial notice of the Wikipedia
definition of Parkinson’s Disease because the internet is not typically a reliable source of
information. Although Defendants did not object to the reference, the Court prefers a
more credible source.”(citation omitted)); BP Prods. N. Am. Inc. v. United States, 716 F.
Supp. 2d 1291, 1295 n.10 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2010) (“Based on the ability of any user to alter
Wikipedia, the court is skeptical of it as a consistently reliable source of information. At this
time, therefore, the court does not accept Wikipedia for the purposes of judicial notice.”);
Steele v. McMahon, No. CIV S-05-1874 DAD P., 2007 WL 2758026, at *8 n.5 (E.D. Cal.
Sept. 21, 2007) (denying a request for judicial notice of a Wikipedia article on tunnel
vision).
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Professor Ian Gallacher, while arguing the need for more “open-ac-
cess” sources of law, has expressed several reservations about
Wikipedia:
[T]he Internet’s unmediated “Wikipedia” site contains articles that
have the appearance of authority, even though they could be com-
pletely inaccurate . . . . The open-access nature of the Wikipedia
site means that anyone can post or edit an entry, and the sophisti-
cated presentation software available as part of the site means that
any entry, whether it be completely accurate or entirely fictitious,
will look the same. Unwitting users of the site could be misled into
following a theory supported by a Wikipedia entry that has no ac-
tual substance in reality. For this reason, many scholars mistrust
anything that appears on the Wikipedia site and do not recognize
it as a viable research source.62
Where, in contrast, courts have revealed their willingness to ac-
cord judicial notice to facts found in Wikipedia articles, they typically
have justified their actions by stating that the noticed facts are not
subject to dispute,63 or by stressing Wikipedia’s value in addressing
topics not likely to be found in traditional scholarly works.64 Federal
Appellate Judge Richard Posner has cited Wikipedia in several Sev-
enth Circuit opinions,65 even while acknowledging in an interview
with the New York Times that “[i]t wouldn’t be right to use . . . in a
critical issue.”66 Judge Posner added that “ ‘[i]f the safety of a product
is at issue, you wouldn’t look it up in Wikipedia.’”67
Wikipedia’s acceptance of—indeed, its reliance upon—open-
source editing is responsible for the perception that it is unreliable
62. Ian Gallacher, Cite Unseen: How Neutral Citation and America’s Law Schools Can Cure
Our Strange Devotion to Bibliographical Orthodoxy and the Constriction of Open and Equal Access to
the Law, 70 ALB. L. REV. 491, 503 n.63 (2007) (citations omitted).
63. E.g., First Nat’l Bank in Sioux Falls v. First Nat’l Bank S.D., 655 F. Supp. 2d 979,
992 n.6 (D.S.D. 2009) (taking notice of geography and population statistics); Io Group,
Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1145 n.8 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (taking notice
of the ability of multiple users to share an IP address).
64. E.g., AVS Found. v. Eugene Berry Enter., L.L.C., No. 11 CV 01084, 2011 WL
6056903, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2011) (citing Wikipedia’s coverage of a sports towel in
trademark action as source for judicial notice of a trademark’s fame).
65. See, e.g., Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing a
Wikipedia article about YouTube); United States v. Ford, 683 F.3d 761, 768 (7th Cir. 2012)
(citing a Wikipedia article about DNA profiling); Prude v. Clarke, 675 F.3d 732, 734 (7th
Cir. 2012) (citing a Wikipedia article about anal fissures).
66. Noam Cohen, Courts Turn to Wikipedia, but Selectively, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2007, at
C3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/29/technology/29wikipedia.html
(quoting Judge Richard A. Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit) (Internal quotations omitted).
67. Id. (Internal quotations omitted).
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and unstable.68 Obviously aware of this perception, Wikipedia takes
pains to explain to would-be contributors its standards for reliability:
Articles should be based on reliable, third-party, published
sources with a reputation for fact-checking and accuracy. This
means that we only publish the opinions of reliable authors, and
not the opinions of Wikipedians who have read and interpreted
primary source material for themselves.
. . . .
The reliability of a source depends on context. Each source
must be carefully weighed to judge whether it is reliable for the
statement being made and is an appropriate source for that con-
tent. In general, the more people engaged in checking facts, ana-
lyzing legal issues, and scrutinizing the writing, the more reliable
the publication. Sources should directly support the information as it
is presented in an article. If no reliable sources can be found on a
topic, Wikipedia should not have an article on it.69
Moreover, in defense of its disclaimer policy,70 Wikipedia points
to the existence of similar disclaimers from a broad array of publica-
tions, including sources such as the Associated Press, the New York
Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Oxford English Dictionary,71
all of which—in print as well as online—courts have found acceptable
for judicial notice.72
68. Gallacher, supra note 62.
69. Identifying Reliable Sources, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Re-
liable_sources (last modified Mar. 4, 2013, 3:05 AM).
70. Wikipedia posts a broad disclaimer:
Please be advised that nothing found here has necessarily been reviewed by peo-
ple with the expertise required to provide you with complete, accurate or reliable
information.
That is not to say that you will not find valuable and accurate information in
Wikipedia; much of the time you will. However, Wikipedia cannot guarantee the va-
lidity of the information found here. The content of any given article may recently
have been changed, vandalized or altered by someone whose opinion does not
correspond with the state of knowledge in the relevant fields.
General Disclaimer, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Disclaimers (last
modified Nov. 6, 2012, 9:52 PM).
71. Non-Wikipedia Disclaimers, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:
Non-Wikipedia_disclaimers (last modified Feb. 9, 2013, 1:32 PM).
72. See, e.g., Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 176–77 (1st Cir. 2005);
Ieradi v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 230 F.3d 594, 598 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000); Am. Fed. Bank v. United
States, 72 Fed. Cl. 586, 621 n.47 (Fed. Cl. 2006); Am. Dairy Queen Corp. v. Blume, No. 11-
358 (RHK/TNL), 2013 WL 1748436, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 11, 2013).
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III. Strategies for Challenging Judicial Notice of Facts on the
Internet
Challenging a court’s judicial notice of essential facts may furnish
a viable way to oppose dispositive motions such as motions to dismiss,
motions for summary judgment, or motions for judgment on the
pleadings, as well as keeping a disputed fact alive for determination by
a jury or judicial fact-finder. The elements of judicial notice deline-
ated by Rule 201(b) suggest several possibilities for challenge by an
opponent of the proffered fact:
(1) The fact is not something generally known within the trial
court’s territorial jurisdiction.
(2) The fact is subject to reasonable dispute.
(3) The fact cannot accurately or readily be determined from the
cited source.
(4) The accuracy of the source can reasonably be questioned.73
These four requirements are not the only possible bases for chal-
lenge. While a court has considerable discretion in determining
whether and when to judicially notice facts relevant to the resolution
of a case, it cannot bypass or ignore the basic requirements of the
rules of evidence by opting to use a judicial notice shortcut.
Rule 201 also states that a court “must take judicial notice if a
party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary informa-
tion.”74 Although the rule does not identify just what sort of informa-
tion is needed, it appears that courts expect to be provided with fairly
specific details. For example, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
fused to accord judicial notice to certain driver’s license records con-
tained in an online database when the Government “offered . . .
nothing but a vague reference to ‘westlaw.com.’”75 The Sixth Circuit
held “that fact alone, without any guidance from the government as to
where in Westlaw one might locate the information, hardly fulfill[ed]
the mandate of Rule 201(d).”76
The phrase “necessary information” also contemplates that the
evidence to be judicially noticed is otherwise acceptable under federal
evidentiary standards. As one federal circuit court has outlined,
“[c]aution must . . . be taken to avoid admitting evidence, through the
73. FED. R. EVID. 201(b).
74. FED. R. EVID. 201(c)(2) (emphasis added). A previous version of the rule used
slightly different wording to express the same concept: “A court shall take judicial notice if
requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.” FED. R. EVID. 201(d),
Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1931 (Jan. 2, 1975) (amended 2011).
75. United States v. Husein, 478 F.3d 318, 337 (6th Cir. 2007).
76. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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use of judicial notice, in contravention of the relevancy, foundation,
and hearsay rules.”77 In affirming a magistrate judge’s refusal to give
judicial notice to facts that were more prejudicial than probative
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, another court explained the in-
quiry this way:
Rule 201 does, indeed, say that judicial notice is “mandatory”
when a party requests it and supplies the necessary supporting in-
formation. But facts subject to judicial notice are not exempt from
analysis under the other rules of evidence.78
A party challenging judicial notice of facts should therefore be
prepared to show the court the necessary information that is lacking,
including the bedrock requirement of relevance. Depending on the
nature of the factual information to be noticed, challenges may assert,
for example, that the material is insufficiently authenticated (under
Rule 901), that it either is inadmissible hearsay (under Rule 801), or
fails to qualify for the hearsay exceptions for business and public
records (under Rules 803(6) and 803(8)) because it lacks trustworthi-
ness, or that it is demonstrably disputable or inaccurate (under the
judicial notice rule itself). While there may be other grounds for chal-
lenging judicial notice of Internet-based facts, the author’s research
reveals that these are the grounds that are asserted with the greatest
frequency in this context.
A. Challenging Judicial Notice on the Basis of Relevance
No matter how well known or indisputable a fact may be, no fact
should be judicially noticed—even upon a party’s request—if it is not
relevant to the litigation.79 Under the Federal Rules, relevant evidence
must satisfy two criteria: (1) it must have the “tendency to make a fact
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence,”80 and
77. Am. Prairie Constr. Co. v. Hoich, 560 F.3d 780, 797 (8th Cir. 2009).
78. Sunstar, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co., Nos. 01 C 736, 01 C 5825, 2006 U.S. Dist. WL
6505615, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2006). See also United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 638
(7th Cir. 2000) (holding in mail- and wire-fraud case that even if the appellate court was
“wrong about the [the defendant’s proffered] web postings being unfairly prejudicial, irrel-
evant, and hearsay, [the district judge] still was justified in excluding the evidence because
it lacked authentication”).
79. See, e.g., Cravens v. Smith, 610 F.3d 1019, 1029 (8th Cir. 2010) (“[A] court may
properly decline to take judicial notice of documents that are irrelevant to the resolution
of a case.”); United States v. Falcon, 957 F. Supp. 1572, 1585 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (“[W]hile the
Rule . . . [says] the court ‘shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with
the necessary information’ . . . a court may refuse to take judicial notice of facts that are
irrelevant to the proceeding or (in certain contexts) otherwise excludable under the Fed-
eral Rules.”).
80. FED. R. EVID. 401(a).
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(2) it must be “of consequence in determining the action.”81 What is
relevant may vary according to the nature of the matter being decided
by the court, as the following examples illustrate:
• In two antitrust cases, the district courts used distances shown
in Internet mapping services to determine the relevant “geo-
graphic market,” i.e., the area in which potential buyers might
choose to look for goods and services they wished to
purchase.82
• When it decides a motion to dismiss, a “court’s review is limited
to the complaint and matters judicially noticeable.”83 In a case
in which the court had to determine whether to grant
Facebook’s motion to dismiss on grounds of subject-matter ju-
risdiction, the district court refused to grant judicial notice to
certain web pages on the social media site because they were
“neither documents on which the Complaint ‘necessarily re-
lies,’ nor documents whose relevance and authenticity are
uncontested.”84
• In reviewing an order of dismissal, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit ruled that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying judicial notice to certain legislative documents. The
court observed that the relevance of the facts to be noticed
“turns on the adequacy of the well-pleaded factual allegations
in the complaint, which are assumed to be true.”85
• In considering a First Amendment challenge to an arts center’s
policy restricting use of its grounds to artistic- or performance-
related events, the Second Circuit declined to take judicial no-
tice of a city website listing the space as a “park”:
While it may be appropriate to take notice of the fact that the web-
site makes such a designation, as the authenticity of the site has not
been questioned, the fact itself has little relevance with regard to
park dedication. The website refers to various types of properties as
“parks” under this menu, including gardens and school
playgrounds.
. . . Moreover, whatever label is used, the City has affirmatively
demonstrated an intent not to treat the Plaza as it would a typical
city park.86
81. FED. R. EVID. 401(b).
82. See Untracht v. Fikri, 454 F. Supp. 2d 289, 309–10 n.11 (W.D. Pa. 2006); Gordon v.
Lewistown Hosp., 272 F. Supp. 2d 393, 429 (M.D. Pa. 2003).
83. Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 11CV1310 L(BLM), 2012 WL 4108114, at *13
(S.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2012).
84. Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 794–95 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (explaining
that “[u]nder the doctrine of incorporation by reference, the Court may consider on a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion not only documents attached to the complaint, but also documents
whose contents are alleged in the complaint, provided the complaint ‘necessarily relies’ on
the documents or contents thereof, the document’s authenticity is uncontested, and the
document’s relevance is uncontested”).
85. Whiting v. AARP, 637 F.3d 355, 364 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
86. Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Union, Local 100 v. City of New York Dep’t of Parks &
Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 549 (2d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
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Further, given that even relevant evidence may be deemed inad-
missible if it is more prejudicial than probative,87 it is certainly argua-
ble that according judicial notice to irrelevant facts is prejudicial. At a
minimum, it risks distracting the fact-finder or confusing the issues.
While the concept of relevance is broad and generally favors admis-
sion,88 parties opposing judicial notice should consider relevance as a
ground for objection to facts offered for judicial notice. If the facts
offered for judicial notice are not relevant to an issue being decided
by the court, the appropriate action is for the court to decline to judi-
cially notice them.
B. Challenging Judicial Notice on the Basis of Authenticity
The authenticity inquiry examines whether the proffered evi-
dence is what it purports to be. To satisfy the requirement of authen-
ticity, “the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”89 Challenging
a request for judicial notice of facts is appropriate when the authentic-
ity of their sources on the Internet can reasonably be disputed.90
The possible bases for questioning the authenticity of an Internet
source are varied. A challenge may raise questions about a website’s
ownership or the identity of the author(s) of its contents, among
other things. As one court explained:
The issues that have concerned courts include the possibility that
third persons other than the sponsor of the website were responsi-
ble for the content of the postings, leading many to require proof
by the proponent that the organization hosting the website actually
posted the statements or authorized their posting. One commenta-
tor has observed “[i]n applying [the authentication standard] to
website evidence, there are three questions that must be answered
explicitly or implicitly. (1) What was actually on the website? (2)
Does the exhibit or testimony accurately reflect it? (3) If so, is it
attributable to the owner of the site?”91
87. FED. R. EVID. 403.
88. As one district court recently paraphrased a classic line from McCormick on Evi-
dence, “[T]o be relevant, evidence need only be a brick, not a wall.” Davis v. Duran, 276
F.R.D. 227, 230 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
89. FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
90. See, e.g., Francarl Realty Corp. v. Town of E. Hampton, 628 F. Supp. 2d 329, 332
n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“This Court may take judicial notice of the contents of a website
assuming, as in this case, its authenticity has not been challenged and it is ‘capable of
accurate and ready determination.’”), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 375 F. App’x 145 (2d Cir.
2010).
91. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 555 (D. Md. 2007) (citations
omitted) (quoting Gregory P. Joseph, Internet and Email Evidence, 13 PRAC. LITIGATOR, Mar.
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Questions of ownership and attribution caught the attention of
the Third Circuit in a case in which statements on a company’s web-
site were at issue, and the court explained why it was vacating and
remanding the district court’s judicial notice of those statements:
[W]e allow judicial notice only from sources not reasonably subject
to dispute. Anyone may purchase an internet address, and so, with-
out proceeding to discovery or some other means of authentica-
tion, it is premature to assume that a webpage is owned by a
company merely because its trade name appears in the uniform
resource locator.92
Many good examples may be found showing successful authentic-
ity challenges to judicial notice in a variety of contexts. In holding that
a defamation claim survived a defendant’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings, one district court declined to take judicial notice of a
YouTube video on the Internet, pointing to questions of authenticity
regarding the proposed evidence.93 In another case, dealing with a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the district court refused to take ju-
dicial notice of deed search results or a press release from a mortga-
gee’s website where those materials had not been authenticated.94
And in a case involving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the district
court explained what would be necessary to persuade it to consider
the contents of a website in determining whether the complaint’s alle-
gations might incorporate website materials by reference:
If it was undisputed that the documents provided by Defendants’
counsel came from Defendants’ website, and were viewed by visi-
tors, during the time period referenced in Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint, the Court would have some difficulty excluding them
from consideration, because most of them would appear [to be]
incorporated by reference in and/or integral to Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint. However, Plaintiff[s] sufficiently dispute the
genuineness and/or accessibility [of] those documents. Simply
stated, the Court is not confident that the documents provided by
Defendants are the documents that are in fact incorporated by ref-
erence in and/or integral to Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.95
Challenges to a website’s authenticity may also center on its con-
tents, its date, or its contents on a particular date. While a court may
take judicial notice of the fact that a party maintained a website, where
2002, at 21, reprinted in 5 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MAN-
UAL, pt. 4, at 21 (9th ed. 2006)).
92. Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 236 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
93. Point Ruston, L.L.C. v. Pac. Nw. Reg’l Council of United Bhd. of Carpenters &
Joiners of Am., 658 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1279 (W.D. Wash. 2009).
94. Trevino v. Merscorp, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 521, 527 (D. Del. 2008).
95. Car-Freshner Corp. v. Getty Images, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 167, 175 (N.D.N.Y.
2011) (citation omitted).
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the content on that website is subject to change, judicial notice is not
appropriate.96 For example, in considering a motion to dismiss in a
class-action suit against an online buyer reward program, the court
declined to take judicial notice of web pages due to a “reasonable dis-
pute” over whether the pages were those that the plaintiffs would have
viewed during their online transactions, given that the pages under-
went several changes over time.97
Creative proponents requesting judicial notice for a website
might suggest that it could be authenticated by using an online
archive such as Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine98 to demonstrate
its contents on a particular date in the past. Such archives maintain
vast repositories of archived and searchable web pages, preserved as
they appeared at various points in time.99 In response to such an argu-
ment, however, the party challenging judicial notice should point to
the analysis of the Eastern District of New York, finding documents
from the Wayback Machine not properly authenticated. Because the
Internet Archive relies on data from third parties concerning the past
contents of a website, “the authorized owners and managers of the
archived websites play no role in ensuring that the material posted in
the Wayback Machine accurately represents what was posted on their
official websites at the relevant time.”100
96. See, e.g., In re Poirier, 346 B.R. 585, 588–89 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2006) (taking judicial
notice of fact that Department of Education maintained a website but declining to notice
its contents because, inter alia, content was subject to change).
97. In re Easysaver Rewards Litig., 737 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1167–68 (S.D. Cal. 2010). See
also Hancock v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. CIV 2:06-CV-00208-FCD-DAD, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39774, at *12 (E.D. Cal. June 14, 2006) (noting that one of the goals of
the limitations placed on judicial notice via Rule 201 is to allow both parties to “examine
each other’s evidence and to present all sides to the trier of fact,” and explaining how that
goal would be frustrated if judicial notice could properly be taken of facts that are suscepti-
ble of reasonable dispute).
98. Wayback Machine, INTERNET ARCHIVE, http://archive.org/web/web.php (last vis-
ited Mar. 17, 2013).
99. As of early 2013, the Wayback Machine claimed to have more than “240 billion
web pages archived from 1996 to a few months ago.” Id. By the date you read this footnote,
the number will have undoubtedly increased.
100. Novak v. Tucows, Inc., No. 06–CV–1909(JFB)(ARL), 2007 WL 922306, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2007), aff’d, 330 F. App’x 204 (2d Cir. 2009). See also St. Luke’s Cataract
& Laser Inst. v. Sanderson, No. 8:06-CV-223-T-MSS, 2006 WL 1320242, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May
12, 2006) (excluding Internet Archive printouts for lack of authentication, but instructing
the plaintiff that “a statement or affidavit from an Internet Archive representative with
personal knowledge of the contents of the Internet Archive website” would be satisfactory to
the court); Chamilia, L.L.C. v. Pandora Jewelry, L.L.C., No. 04-CV-6017 (KMK), 2007 WL
2781246, at *6 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2007) (“In support of its claim, Plaintiff has submit-
ted a series of archived web pages from an Internet service called the ‘Wayback Machine,’
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It should be noted, however, that although the Internet Archive
recommends that legal users “seek judicial notice or simply ask [their]
opposing party to stipulate to the documents’ authenticity,” it also
contains instructions for obtaining authenticated copies of its con-
tents, for a fee.101
The inherently evolving and impermanent nature of web pages
will always furnish possible grounds for challenge. Counsel consider-
ing raising such challenges should be prepared to examine a site’s
authorship, its ownership, its contents, and its modifications over the
relevant time at issue in a case.
C. Challenging Judicial Notice on the Basis of Hearsay
Despite opinions such as St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp,
Inc.102 expressing courts’ mistrust of information from websites, courts
today are increasingly willing to consider Internet evidence. One dis-
trict court explained its disagreement with St. Clair’s broad prohibi-
tion against reliance on the Internet, stating, “[t]he truth of
anonymous postings on a white supremacist website would be mark-
edly different than, for example, the truth of postings made by a well-
established business on its own website.”103 Such willingness should
nonetheless be challenged where judicial notice is unwarranted, as is
the case with evidence that is inadmissible because it violates one or
more evidentiary rules. An objection based on the evidentiary prohibi-
tion against hearsay may provide a basis for a viable challenge.
One of the bedrock principles of the rules of evidence is that an
out-of-court statement being offered for “the truth of the matter as-
serted” is inadmissible hearsay,104 unless it fits one of the non-hearsay
classifications105 or can otherwise be admitted under an exception to
the basic hearsay rule.106 When a party proffers the contents of a web-
site into evidence, a court should determine whether those contents
are offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and conse-
quently, whether such material constitutes hearsay under Federal Rule
of Evidence 801 or whether it qualifies for one of the Rule 803 excep-
which Defendant moves to strike. This putative evidence suffers from fatal problems of
authentication under [Federal Rule of Evidence] 901.”).
101. Information Requests, INTERNET ARCHIVE, http://archive.org/legal/ (last visited
Mar. 17, 2013).
102. 76 F. Supp. 2d 773 (S.D. Tex. 1999). See also supra text accompanying note 51.
103. United States v. Cameron, 762 F. Supp. 2d 152, 161 (D. Me. 2011).
104. FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2).
105. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d).
106. See FED. R. EVID. 803; FED. R. EVID. 804.
\\jciprod01\productn\S\SAN\48-1\san102.txt unknown Seq: 21  3-JAN-14 14:42
Summer 2013] CHALLENGING JUDICIAL NOTICE 63
tions.107 Because such a statement is made out of court, it is not made
under oath. And even though an out-of-court statement may qualify as
admissible under the rules of evidence, it may still fail to convince a
jury to rule in favor of the party who offers it. Even if a hearsay state-
ment comes in, a factfinder still has to decide among competing ver-
sions of the facts proffered by opposing parties. As one commentator
explains, “[h]earsay and judicial notice considerations overlap but are
not identical: ‘It takes more than an exception to the hearsay rule . . .
to justify judicial notice.’ That something more is indisputability.”108
For example, litigants frequently request judicial notice of docu-
ments filed in other courts and in other cases, and to the extent that
such requests ask only that the existence of such documents be judi-
cially noticed, they are permissible. While it is appropriate for a court
to take judicial notice of the fact of the filing or the other litigation, it
is error for a court to take judicial notice of the contents of those filings
for the truth of the matters asserted therein (unless they meet a hear-
say exception).109 In one instance, the Second Circuit cautioned that
“[f]acts adjudicated in a prior case do not meet either test of indispu-
tability contained in Rule 201(b): they are not usually common knowl-
edge, nor are they derived from an unimpeachable source.”110 In
another case involving an alleged Ponzi scheme, the Eighth Circuit
reversed the district court’s grant of judicial notice to a company’s
online records emphasizing that facts to be judicially noticed should
not be subject to any form of reasonable dispute:
It is unclear whether the district court took judicial notice of the
truth of the matter contained in the records, i.e., that [one of the
plaintiffs] is in fact a director [of a company controlled by one of
the defendants], or simply took judicial notice that the records so
stated. Judicial notice of a fact is only to be taken when that fact is
not subject to reasonable dispute. In his declaration supporting his
107. See, e.g., Novak v. Tucows, Inc., No. 06–CV–1909(JFB)(ARL), 2007 WL 922306, at
*5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2007) (granting, on hearsay and authentication grounds, a defense
motion to strike exhibits consisting of printouts of web pages), aff’d, 330 F. App’x 204 (2d
Cir. 2009); Milo v. Galante, No. 3:09cv1389 (JBA), 2011 WL 1214769, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar.
28, 2011) (“The Court may take judicial notice of these public records . . . only to establish
the timing and existence of the information contained in them or the existence of litiga-
tion and related filings; the Court may not take judicial notice of the truth of the facts
asserted in the media reports or legal filings.”).
108. Dansky, supra note 60, at 19, 21 (quoting Doss v. Clearwater Title Co., 551 F.3d
634, 640 (7th Cir. 2008)).
109. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc., 969 F.2d 1384, 1388
(2d Cir. 1992) (holding that facts contained in a bankruptcy court order were an improper
subject for judicial notice).
110. Int’l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass’n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 146 F.3d 66, 70
(2d Cir. 1998).
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opposition to the motion for judicial notice, [the plaintiff] dis-
puted that he was ever a director on National Investments’ board.
This subjects the issue to reasonable dispute. Accordingly, to the
extent that the district court took judicial notice of the truth of the
document’s content, this was an abuse of discretion.111
In cases in which a party wants the court to take judicial notice of
the contents of its opponent’s website, counsel may be able to argue
such indisputability. For example, in O’Toole v. Northrop Grumman Cor-
poration,112 the plaintiff asked the district court to take judicial notice
of the actual earnings history posted on his former employer’s website
and gave the complete address for the page to which its quarterly re-
ports were linked, arguing that because Northrup Grumman created
the information, it should not be able to dispute it.113 Although Nor-
thrup Grumman argued on appeal that the lower court’s judicial no-
tice was erroneous, the Tenth Circuit regarded the corporation’s
arguments as unpersuasive because it failed to explain “why its own
website’s posting of historical retirement fund earnings is unrelia-
ble.”114 Furthermore, although Northrop Grumman could have asked
the district court for a hearing under Rule 201(e),115 it did not do so.
The court of appeals concluded that “Northrop Grumman’s failure to
dispute its own information . . . contributes to its indisputability.”116
In another case, in which one of the issues was whether an em-
ployee had been forced to sign a release of his medical records, the
plaintiff asked the trial court to take judicial notice of his records on
the National Personnel Records Center’s website.117 Although the
trial court initially accorded judicial notice to the website records, it
later withdrew that notice because the plaintiff also testified about
them. In holding that the trial court erred, the Seventh Circuit ob-
served both that “[t]he information on the website was not duplica-
tive . . . . [and that] the fact that the [National Personnel Records
Center] maintains medical records of military personnel is appropri-
ate for judicial notice because it is not subject to reasonable dis-
pute.”118 Exercising its prerogative to take judicial notice of the
website on appeal, the Seventh Circuit pointedly accused the defend-
111. Lustgraaf v. Behrens, 619 F.3d 867, 885–86 (8th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
112. 499 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2007).
113. Id. at 1224–25.
114. Id. at 1225.
115. “On timely request, a party is entitled to be heard on the propriety of taking judi-
cial notice and the nature of the fact to be noticed.” FED. R. EVID. 201(e).
116. O’Toole, 499 F.3d at 1225.
117. Denius v. Dunlap, 330 F.3d 919, 925 (7th Cir. 2003).
118. Id. at 926.
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ants of causing “additional judicial work by contesting a factual issue
that, according to information readily available in the public domain,
cannot be reasonably disputed.”119
Although courts routinely—and without much hesitation—over-
rule hearsay objections when public records or business records are
offered into evidence, when challenging judicial notice of website evi-
dence, opponents will be more successful if they can show the court
the improper evidentiary purposes for which the fact and the source
being proffered serve.
D. Challenging Judicial Notice on the Basis of Accuracy
Another potential evidentiary challenge concerns the accuracy of
the facts appearing on a website. Rule 201 permits judicial notice of
facts when they “can be accurately and readily determined from
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”120 Such
challenges to accuracy may elicit a response similar to the following
remarks made sua sponte by a district court when asked to take judicial
notice of web pages from two different sites:
Taking judicial notice of facts on a webpage . . . poses heightened
concerns because anyone can say anything on a webpage, and the
posting of a “fact” on a webpage does not necessarily make it true.
The unregulated content of webpages poses significant hurdles for
the court to find that a webpage, or its host or author, is necessarily
“a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”121
The question of a website’s accuracy, for judicial notice purposes,
was also the subject of the following commentary by another district
court: “I doubt that a website can be said to provide an ‘accurate’
reference, at least in normal circumstances where the information can
be modified at will by the web master and, perhaps, others.”122
Establishing the accuracy of the facts to be judicially noticed is
vital. For example, courts have often used Internet mapping tools
such as Mapquest123 or Google Maps124 to take judicial notice of facts
demonstrating geography or the distances between locations.125 In so
119. Id. at 927.
120. FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2).
121. Knight v. Standard Ins. Co., No. CIV 07-1691 WBS EFB, 2008 WL 343852, at *2 n.2
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2008) (citations omitted).
122. Fenner v. Suthers, 194 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1148–49 (D. Colo. 2002).
123. MAPQUEST, http://www.mapquest.com/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
124. GOOGLE MAPS, https://maps.google.com/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
125. See, e.g., Citizens for Peace in Space v. Colorado Springs, 477 F.3d 1212, 1218 n.2
(10th Cir. 2007) (taking judicial notice of the 310 yard distance between two locations, as
measured using a web application, www.gmap-pedometer.com); Rindfleisch v. Gentiva
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doing, they typically refer to there being no reasonable dispute about
the accuracy of the distances or locations shown. Yet, such mapping
tools are not necessarily flawless, and a challenger may be able to raise
a court’s concerns about their accuracy. For example, in a Penn-
sylvania case in which it was critical to know the distance between a
school and the scene of a drug crime, the appellate court ruled that
by taking judicial notice of the distance shown by Mapquest, the trial
judge abused his discretion.126 The court consequently reversed and
remanded the case.127 Concluding that the accuracy of Internet sites
such as Mapquest is not so reliable as to be beyond reasonable ques-
tioning, the court also observed that “[a]n internet site determining
distances does not have the same inherent accuracy as do profession-
ally accepted medical dictionaries, or encyclopedias, or other matters
of common knowledge within the community.”128 The same may well
be true of any number of general reference sites on the Internet, and
judicial-notice challengers would be well advised to compare their
data with what is available in more traditional reference sources as
well as what is available in comparable Internet reference sites.129
Another important factor in determining a website’s accuracy is
whether its contents are susceptible to bias, overstatement, or other
matters that would suggest inaccuracy. Finding error in the lower
court’s judicial notice of facts on a business party’s website, the Third
Circuit observed:
[A] company’s website is a marketing tool. Often, marketing mate-
rial is full of imprecise puffery that no one should take at face
value. Thus courts should be wary of finding judicially noticeable
facts amongst all the fluff; private corporate websites, particularly
when describing their own business, generally are not the sorts of
Health Sys., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d 246, 259 n.13 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (using Google Maps to
take judicial notice of the miles and estimated driving time between courthouses); United
States v. Williams, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1378 n.6 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (taking judicial notice
of driving distances by using Mapquest); Marcavage v. New York, No. 05 Civ. 4949 (RJS),
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107724, at *21–22 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010) (using a Google Map
and a satellite photograph to take judicial notice of the location of a demonstration). See
also supra note 81.
126. Commonwealth v. Brown, 839 A.2d 433, 435–37 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
127. Id. at 437.
128. Id. at 435–36.
129. For an illustration of this point, consider the following personal anecdote. The
author has lived in the same house since 1997. The distance between her home and a
neighbor’s is correctly shown as 0.2 miles on Google Maps and Bing Maps, but is incor-
rectly shown as 0.09 miles on Mapquest. While an error of slightly more than a tenth of a
mile is not much, it still suggests that counsel opposing a request for judicial notice should
check for accuracy by comparing results using different mapping services.
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“sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned” that
our judicial notice rule contemplates.130
Finally, courts should be wary of the possibility of deliberate mis-
statements being posted to a website for reasons antithetical to justice
or to the public interest. Reversing a lower court’s grant of judicial
notice to a statement of purpose on a governmental website, the Sixth
Circuit identified a potential—and alarming—consequence if such a
misstatement is taken as accurate. Namely, that “government agencies
could defuse any complaint alleging improper governmental motives
merely by stating an arguably proper motive on their website,” thereby
eviscerating laws requiring inquiry into governmental motives.131
IV. Timeliness and Due Process Considerations
Federal Rule of Evidence 201(d) declares that “[t]he court may
take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding.”132 Although liti-
gants are entitled to be heard on “the propriety of taking judicial no-
tice and the nature of the fact to be noticed,” they must make a
“timely request” for that hearing.133 Alternatively, if a court takes judi-
cial notice on its own before notifying a party of its action, the party,
“on request, is still entitled to be heard.”134 All of these provisions
indicate the critical importance of timing in making requests for, or
challenges to, judicial notice.
Although the plain language of the judicial notice rule indicates
that courts may take judicial notice whenever they wish,135 in some
instances the judicial notice decision comes so early that it effectively
disadvantages one of the litigants. When a case is still in the pleadings
stage, for example, taking judicial notice may be reversible error. In
the Victaulic covenant-not-to-compete case discussed earlier,136 the
court declared error in the district court’s decision to take judicial
notice of facts external to the pleadings in deciding a motion to
dismiss:
130. Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 236 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (va-
cating and remanding the district court’s order taking judicial notice of facts set out on a
website).
131. Passa v. Columbus, 123 F. App’x 694, 698 (6th Cir. 2005).
132. FED. R. EVID. 201(d).
133. FED. R. EVID. 201(e). In the original wording of the rule, “[a] party is entitled
upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial
notice and the tenor of the matter noticed.” FED. R. EVID. 201(e), Pub. L. 93–595, 88 Stat.
1931 (Jan. 2, 1975) (amended 2011).
134. FED. R. EVID. 201(e).
135. FED. R. EVID. 201(d).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 91, 129.
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While the rules allow a court to take judicial notice at any stage of
the proceedings, we believe that it should be done sparingly at the
pleadings stage. Only in the clearest of cases should a district court
reach outside the pleadings for facts necessary to resolve a case at
that point. Resolving a thorny issue like reasonableness by resort-
ing to a party’s unauthenticated marketing material falls far short
of the bar.137
Waiting too long to object to a trial court’s decision to take judi-
cial notice will be fatal to that issue on appeal. As a bankruptcy appel-
late panel explained, “[w]here a party does not make a timely request
to be heard on the issue of . . . judicial notice, that party has waived its
right to appeal the propriety of taking judicial notice.”138
Rule 201 provides no guidance for determining what is timely.
Some courts have set out a specific time frame for requesting a hear-
ing,139 while others recognize that the question of timeliness ought to
be treated with more flexibility.140 The Advisory Committee note to
Rule 201 supports the latter approach.141
Because a court can take notice on its own motion,142 judicial
notice opponents should be attuned to the timeliness of the court’s
notification to the parties that it is doing so. Taking such notice with-
out observing the niceties of due process may constitute an abuse of
discretion.143 For example, in calculating attorneys’ fees, one district
court was held to have abused its discretion when it took judicial no-
tice sua sponte of data in the Consumer Price Index, without giving the
other party notice and opportunity to be heard.144
137. Victaulic Co. v. Tieman, 499 F.3d 227, 236–37 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
138. Hertzel v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. (In re Hertzel), 329 B.R. 221, 233 (B.A.P. 6th
Cir. 2005).
139. E.g., In re Henderson, 197 B.R. 147, 156–57 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996) (“[T]he re-
quest for an opportunity to be heard must be filed within ten days of the entry on the
docket of the order accompanying this opinion.”).
140. E.g., Beasley v. U.S. Welding Serv., Inc., 129 Fed. App’x 901, 902 (5th Cir. 2005)
(suggesting that party could have requested hearing “after the district court entered its
findings of fact and conclusions of law by way of a post-trial motion following the court’s
entry of final judgment”).
141. FED. R. EVID. 201(e) advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. app at 321
(2006), (“No formal scheme of giving notice is provided. . . . And in the absence of ad-
vance notice, a request made after the fact could not in fairness be considered untimely.”).
142. FED. R. EVID. 201(c)(1) (“The court . . . may take judicial notice on its own.”).
143. For well-reasoned arguments against appellate courts’ making sua sponte decisions
in general, some of which would be applicable in the judicial-notice context, see Adam A.
Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate
Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245 (2002).
144. Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632, 648–49 (7th Cir. 2011) (find-
ing the Consumer Price Index (CPI) judicially noticeable but holding that district court’s
sue sponte notice “deprived plaintiff of an opportunity to contest the application of the CPI
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The importance of providing a party with notice and opportunity
to be heard cannot be overstated. In American Prairie Construction Com-
pany v. Hoich,145 one issue before the court was whether a certified
public accountant present at a settlement hearing should be regarded
as the agent of one of the defendants, John Hoich. The district court
found a book written by Hoich that was available online and that con-
tained photographs of the accountant with captions identifying him as
the defendant’s personal accountant.146 The court took judicial notice
of the book, its photographs, and the captions.147 This evidence—
along with other more tangible evidence—supported the court’s hold-
ing that the accountant served as an apparent agent for Hoich during
the settlement hearing and that Hoich was thereby liable as a princi-
pal to the agreement reached there. In reversing that decision, the
Eighth Circuit held that “[w]hile courts are often required to conduct
independent research regarding questions of law, ‘[o]n fact ques-
tions, the court should not use the doctrine of judicial notice to go
outside the record unless the facts are matters of common knowledge
or are capable of certain verification.’”148
Finally, despite Rule 201’s language indicating that courts may
take judicial notice at any stage of the proceedings,149 asking an appel-
late court to take judicial notice of facts in order to establish error in
the lower court can backfire on the party making that argument. In F
& G Research, Inc. v. Paten Wireless Technology, Inc.,150 the question on
appeal was whether the court had personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendants. The plaintiff-appellant asked the circuit court to take judi-
cial notice of information on the defendants’ websites to establish that
they had done business in the jurisdiction and to contest the lower
court’s dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds.151 The higher
court refused, explaining:
or to argue for a particular manner of applying it to the present case”). But cf. Osage Tribe
of Indians of Oklahoma v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 390, 401 n.20 (Fed. Cl. 2010)
(“‘[O]nly a rare case insists that a judge must notify the parties before taking judicial no-
tice of a fact on his own motion, and some authorities suggest that such a requirement is
needless.’” (quoting 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 333 (Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds., 6th
ed. 2006))).
145. 529 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (D.S.D. 2007), rev’d, 560 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 2009).
146. Id. at 1068.
147. Id.
148. Am. Prairie Constr. Co. v. Hoich, 560 F.3d 780, 798 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Al-
vary v. United States, 302 F.2d 790, 794 (2d Cir. 1962)).
149. FED. R. EVID. 201(d).
150. No. 2007-1206, 2007 WL 2992480, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 15, 2007).
151. Id. at *2.
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Even if the information on the companies’ websites qualifies as in-
formation from a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned, the problem with that information is that it was not
offered to the district court, and that court therefore was not able
to make a determination as to its relevance and weight.152
Conclusion
I have a close friend whose bankruptcy practice keeps her in
court quite often. According to her, asking a court to take judicial
notice is the “lazy way” to get facts admitted into evidence. While I
disagree with that opinion as a general matter, I have to admit my
concerns that easy access to web-based data—particularly given the
ubiquity of smartphones, tablets, and Wi-Fi access—as well as the ever-
expanding content on the Internet are significant factors that will
tempt more lawyers and more courts to overlook or shortcut the re-
quirements of the judicial notice rule. As this article has demon-
strated, judicial attitudes toward the Internet as a repository of
knowledge are shifting. Fewer courts are exhibiting St. Clair levels of
mistrust of Internet-based sources, and even Wikipedia is coming to
be seen as an acceptable source for certain kinds of data.
But the change of attitude does not call for other change. There
is no need for drafting a new rule to cover judicial notice of facts on
the Internet, nor does the current Rule 201 need to be amended to
do so. Rule 201 is up to the task for which it was designed, even in this
situation. Familiarity invites a relaxation of standards; however, the re-
quirements of the rule should be carefully examined and applied
each time it is invoked. Finally, in our enthusiasm for using these eas-
ily accessed sources on the web, we should never forget—whether we
are proponents or opponents of such evidence—that evidence of-
fered via judicial notice may in fact be challenged and found inadmis-
sible under other provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
152. Id.
